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Recent developments in macroeconomics resurrect the view that wel-
fare costs of in￿ ation arise because the latter acts as a tax on money
balances. Empirical contributions show that wage re-negotiations take
place while expiring contracts are still in place. Bringing these seemingly
unrelated aspects together in a stylized general equilibrium model, we ￿nd
a disciplining e⁄ect of a positive in￿ ation target on the wage markup and
identify a long-term trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and output.
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1 Introduction.
Recent developments in macroeconomics contradict the widely held belief that
permanently higher in￿ ation cannot a⁄ect unemployment. A long-run relation-
ship between in￿ ation and real activity is obtained in New Keynesian models
based on price staggering, where in￿ ation has adverse e⁄ects due to relative
price dispersion and to the e⁄ect of expectations on mark-ups (Goodfriend and
King, 1997; Woodford, 2003; Schmitt-GrohŁ and Uribe, 2004). Benigno and
Ricci (2007) resurrect the ￿grease in the wheels￿argument, showing that down-
ward nominal wage rigidity generates a long-run in￿ ation-unemployment trade-
o⁄ at low in￿ ation rates. Other contributions point in the opposite direction.
For instance, Graham and Snower (2008) show that the interaction of staggered
￿The authors are grateful to G. Ascari, P. Benigno, H. Dixon, A. Cukierman, J. Dri¢ ll,
S. Gnocchi, L. Lambertini, F. Mattesini, D. Soskice, seminar participants at the Universi-
ties of Pavia, Milan Bicocca, Rome CEIS Seminar (Tor Vergata), 2009 EEA, 2010 Atlantic
Association Annual Conference for useful comments on earlier drafts.
1nominal contracts with hyperbolic discounting leads to a positive long-run e⁄ect
of in￿ ation on real variables.
We share the view that modern monetary models may underestimate the
bene￿cial e⁄ects of in￿ ation on wage markups, but we highlight a di⁄erent dis-
ciplining channel. A positive in￿ ation rate is typically associated with higher
nominal interest rates, which increase the opportunity cost of holding money.
Thus in￿ ation is a tax on money balances. To model this e⁄ect, we introduce
money in the utility function, as in Christiano et al. (2005).1 The next step in
our analysis is to identify a channel such that the in￿ ation-tax e⁄ect on money
balances might discipline wage markups. In our stylized model, we assume that
in each period wages are predetermined to macroeconomic variables.2 As a re-
sult wage setters internalize the e⁄ect of their wage choice on their own real
money holdings. In the paper we show that such an e⁄ect is negative and be-
comes stronger with the expected in￿ ation rate, inducing wage setters to limit
their wage claims. We therefore obtain a new justi￿cation for the existence of a
non-vertical Phillips curve. Model simulations show that a moderate in￿ ation
rate can generate substantial output gains relative to both the Friedman rule
and the commitment to price stability, popularized in standard New Keyne-
sian models. A central tenet of the New Keynesian literature is that nominal
rigidities determine socially ine¢ cient outcomes. Our paper reverses this view:
properly designed monetary policies may take advantage of predetermined nom-
inal wages to discipline wage setters. This, in turn, requires a positive in￿ ation
rate.
The crucial mechanism behind our result lies in the combination of an
in￿ ation-tax e⁄ect on money holdings with the assumption of pre-determined
wages. This latter hypothesis is in contrast with New Keynesian models that
typically model nominal wage rigidities as a mechanical transposition of the
Calvo pricing formalism originally designed to characterize ￿rms pricing behav-
ior (Calvo, 1983). Relative to Calvo pricing, the pre-determined wage hypoth-
esis neglects relative wage dispersion ￿the undesirable consequence of in￿ ation
under the Calvo formalism ￿but allows wage setters to internalize their con-
sequences for household choices. In fact our approach is in line with recent
empirical evidence on wage bargaining that i) downplays the importance of
relative wage dispersion because ￿rms concentrate nominal wage changes in a
particular month of the year, following country-speci￿c patterns (Duarte et al.
2009); ii) shows that wage renegotiations take place while expiring contracts
are still in place, enabling wage setters to act as Stackelberg leaders (Du Caju
et al. 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines
our model. Section 3 discusses the benchmark case of ￿ exible nominal wages.
Section 4 introduces pre-determined wages and explains why a positive in￿ ation
target disciplines wage setters and outlines implications for the optimal in￿ ation
rate. Section 5 concludes.
1Lagos and Wright (2005) point out that this is a reduced form monetary model, where
assumptions about money holdings are meant to stand in for some role of money that is not
made explicit, i.e. that it helps overcome spatial, temporal, or informational frictions.
2See Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) for a similar assumption.
22 The model.
We build on Neiss (1999), where a staggered timing structure in the acquisition
of nominal money balances within a money-in-the-utility function framework
generates a discretionary in￿ ation equilibrium when the economy is plagued by
monopolistic distortions. To simplify the analysis, we impose full price ￿ exibility
in the goods market, whereas wages are pre-determined.3
2.1 Households




















where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the intertemporal discount rate, Ct;i is a consumption bundle,





















where Bt;i denotes holdings of one-period bonds; wt;i is the nominal wage; ￿t
is a labor-income tax;4 ￿t denotes ￿rms pro￿ts; Rt is the nominal interest rate.
Note that Mt+1;i is chosen at t.

































The money demand equation is
3Right from the outset, it is worth emphasizing that this assumption completely removes
in￿ation costs that plague sticky-price models when the Calvo (1983) or Rotemberg (1982)
pricing formalisms are adopted. It should be noted, however, that such costs fall in the degree
of in￿ation indexation adopted by non-optimizing ￿rms. Following the celebrated Christiano
et al. (2005) contribution, several estimated DSGE models assume full indexation to trend
in￿ation (Christo⁄el et al. 2008, Jondeau and Sahuc, 2008). This is crucial to track down
observed in￿ation persistence. Barnes et al. (2009) estimate a structural equation model
exhibiting a very high degree of in￿ation indexation.

















As in Neiss (1999) the agent faces a trade-o⁄ between period t consumption
and period t + 1 holdings of nominal money balances.
Observe that (7) can also be interpreted as a demand function: when the
central bank increases next period nominal money balances, coeteris paribus
current consumption increases. Straightforward manipulations would show that
1
" denotes the income elasticity of money demand.
The optimal labor supply condition will be introduced at a later stage, when
we consider di⁄erent wage-setting regimes.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms uniformly distrib-
uted over the interval [0;1]. Each ￿rm (j) produces a di⁄erentiated good using
a Cobb-Douglas production function:5











denotes a labor bundle and ￿ is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution
across di⁄erent labor inputs.
The price is set as a markup, ￿p = ￿
￿￿1 = 1
￿, over real marginal costs.
For any given level of its labor demand, lt;j, the ￿rm must decide the optimal
allocation across labor inputs, subject to aggregation technology (9). Firm (j)
















is the wage index.


















5Capital is assumed ￿xed and normalized to unity.
4Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is
Yt = Ct + Gt (15)
where Gt is the public expenditure, de￿ned below.
2.3 Monetary Policy
By assumption, the central bank directly controls the money growth rate mt
6
Mt+1 = Mt(1 + mt) (16)
Using (7), (16) and (12), it is straightforward to show that
Pt+1
Pt
= 1 + ￿t = 1 + mt (17)
Central bank target determines the in￿ ation rate.
2.4 Fiscal policy
The government supplies an exogenous amount of public good Gt and imple-
ments redistributive policies through transfers Tt.7 Government ￿nancing is
obtained through a labor-income tax and seigniorage, Mt
Pt mt, which is obtained
from (16). For sake of simplicity we impose a balanced-budget rule.







We assume that Gt
Yt = g and Gt
Yt = T are exogenously given.
3 Flexible wages.
The ￿ exible wages solution provides the benchmark case for the evaluation of
our results. Each household maximizes (1) subject to the (2), given (13) and
(14). This amounts to
(1 ￿ ￿t)wt = ￿￿wl
￿
t Ctpt (19)
where ￿w = ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿1 denotes the wage mark-up under ￿ exible wages. As






















6This is equivalent to assume that the central bank implements a constant nominal interest
rate rule Rt = 1+m
￿ , which implies that
Mt+1
Mt = 1 + mt.
7Business cycle models typically neglect transfer as they are completely smoothed by op-
timizing households. Transfers become relevant here because they raise the amount of distor-
tionary taxation levied by the government.
5Observe that ￿p￿w denotes the labor and goods market wedge, whereas ￿t
creates a tax wedge due to the distortionary taxation. The competitive (Pareto
optimal) level of employment obtains if 1￿￿t
￿p￿w = 1.
In this framework optimal in￿ ation is determined considering the trade-o⁄
between increasing in￿ ation or taxes to ￿nance the public good. Only if non-
distortionary taxation is available, or if Gt = Tt = 0, the optimal monetary
policy coincides with the Friedman rule mt = ￿ ￿ 1. However, it has to be
noted that in￿ ation does a⁄ect neither the labor nor the goods market wedge.
4 Predetermined wages.
Now consider a labor market regime where wages are preset with respect to
monetary policy. The timing of the game is as follows.
1. At the beginning of the period, the central bank commits to a ￿xed money
growth rate consistent with a certain exogenous in￿ ation target, ￿ m.
2. Given the central bank rule, households set the nominal wage rate, wt;
that maximizes expected utility (1), conditional to the expected values
for labor demand, for the money growth rule and for their own choices
concerning money demand and consumption, i.e. conditions (10), (14),
(16), (7), (6), (20). To simplify exposition, we characterize the nominal
wage rate as wt = ￿ wtPe
t , where Pe
t is the rational expectation of the price
level and ￿ wt is the desired real wage rate
3. Households choose consumption and next-period nominal money holdings.
Simultaneously, full price ￿ exibility ensures that markets clear.
Relative to the ￿ ex-wage solution, the key di⁄erence is that now households
anticipate the e⁄ects of their wage choice on real money holdings. Imposing
rational expectations (￿e
t = ￿e












Imposing also the symmetrical equilibrium we obtain the desired wage rate,
which is lower than in the ￿ ex-wage case:



































By comparing (23) to (19), it is clear that the combination of predetermined
wages and positive in￿ ation target has a disciplining e⁄ect on labor market
distortions.
8Equation (22) has been obtained substituting (6), (16), (20) into (7) and imposing rational
expectations.
6The rationale is as follows. Under ￿ exible wages, the wage-setters￿optimiza-
tion problem is solved by choosing a real wage such that consumption falls below
the perfectly competitive rate. This loss of utility is more than compensated
for by the corresponding reduction in labor e⁄ort. When wages are predeter-
mined and the central bank adopts an in￿ ation targeting strategy, households
also anticipate that real money balances fall due to the adverse e⁄ect of the
wage choice on consumption. The term ￿m captures the impact of a real wage
increase on expected real money holdings. The size of this adverse e⁄ect is un-
ambiguously increasing in ￿ m.9 By substituting (24) (23) into (14) and imposing
































Straightforward manipulations would show that the in￿ ation target e⁄ect on
employment (and thus on consumption) is always positive, i.e. @lt
@ ￿ m > 0 (see
Appendix A for a formal proof).
To support intuition, it is worth emphasizing the key di⁄erence relative to
standard New Keynesian models incorporating nominal rigidities. In our frame-
work the wage choice is antecedent to consumption, employment and money
demand realizations, whereas under Calvo￿ s wage setting rule all these variables
obtain simultaneously to the optimizing wage setters￿decision.
5 The non-vertical Phillips curve.
5.1 In￿ ation and the employment gap
As shown above, the combination of preset wages and in￿ ation targets implies
wage moderation and thus a non-vertical Phillips curve. A quantitative ￿ avor
of our results is obtained by calibrating the model to the US economy, as in
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004).10 The time unit is meant to be a year. We set
the subjective discount rate, ￿, at 0:97, consistent with a 3% real interest rate.
Given the 4% average in￿ ation rate observed over the period 1960-2000, this
implies a 7% nominal interest rate. We assume constant returns to scale (i.e.,
￿ = 1). To sharpen our analysis, at this stage we neglect ￿scal policy issues by
assuming that Gt = Tt = 0.11 We assume an inverse Frisch elasticity, ￿, equal to
one and set the preference parameter ￿ so that in the non-distorted equilibrium
households allocate 20% of their time to work. The implied semi-elasticity of
money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate is equal to ￿4:55. We
calibrate the price and wage markups at 1:05 and 1:15, respectively.12 These
calibrations imply a 9% employment gap in the ￿ exible wage regime. The values
9Recall that 1
" < 1.
10We check the robustness of our results for alternative scenarios. See Appendix B.
11Following Neiss (1999) we assume here that seigniorage revenues are returned to house-
holds as lump-sum transfers.
12We calibrate the labor and goods market wedge, ￿p￿w, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004)
who restrict imperfect competition to the goods market. A similar markup structure is used
Christiano et al. (2002). Larger markups (Gali et al. 2007) would unambiguously raise the
optimal in￿ation target.
7for ￿ and " are calibrated to obtain the income elasticity of money demand and
the income money velocity at 0:9513 and 1:8, respectively.14
By using (25), we obtain a non-vertical Phillips curve plotting the employ-
ment gap and the in￿ ation rate (see Figure 1).15
Figure 1 ￿The Phillips Curve
When ￿ m = ￿ ￿ 1 the central bank implements the Friedman rule, the dis-
ciplining e⁄ect is nil and the employment gap is maximum, just like the ￿ ex
wage case, when (21) obtains. Positive in￿ ation targets cause non-negligible
reductions in the employment gap.
This result is robust to changes in key parameters such as the income elas-
ticity of money demand and the inverse Frisch elasticity, measured by " and ￿
13It is worth noting that money demand studies report income elasticities which typically
are below or close to one (see, e.g., Choi and Oh (2003), Dib (2004), Knell and Stix (2005)
and references therein). Christiano et al. (2005) obtain an estimate of 0:1. We check the
robustness of our results also for their calibration (see Appendix B).
14Income elasticity of money demand is 1="; the value for ￿ is obtained by imposing 1:8 =
Y
M=P , where M=P is obtained from (22) under C = l￿.
15The employment gap is 1 ￿ lt (￿=￿)
￿ 1
1+￿ .
8(see Figure 2 below).16





























Figure 2 ￿Consumption/e⁄ort gain from 4% in￿ ation
Even though the theoretical debate on the optimal in￿ ation target is far
from settled, empirical macro models have begun to incorporate an exogenous
and positive long-run in￿ ation rate. A growing literature has shown that New
Keynesian models signi￿cantly improve their ability to replicate the business
cycle facts if monetary policy rules are assumed to target time-varying, non-
zero long-run in￿ ation rates (see Cogley and Sbordone, 2008, and the references
therein). Ireland (2007) estimates a New Keynesian model to draw inferences
about the behavior of the Fed unobserved in￿ ation target. His results indicate
that the target soared from 1:25% in 1959 to over 8% percent in the mid-to-late
1970s before falling back to below 2:5% in 2004. He provides evidence which
is consistent with the view that shifts in the secular trend in in￿ ation, i.e. the
expected long-term in￿ ation rate, could be attributed to a systematic tendency
for Federal Reserve policy either to limit the contractionary consequences of
adverse shocks (Blinder, 1982; Hetzel, 1998; Mayer, 1998) or to exploit favorable
economic conditions to eventually bring in￿ ation down (Bom￿m and Rudebusch,
2000; and Orphanides and Wilcox, 2002).
Our model is consistent with the view that persistent changes in real macro-
economic factors induced the Fed to shift the in￿ ation target. In Figure 3 the
dashed line shows the in￿ ation target adjustments necessary to stabilize the
employment gap following a persistent mark-up increase.17 For instance, an
in￿ ation target surge from 4% to 6% is required to sterilize the real e⁄ects of a
16The gains fall with the cost of in￿ating (") and with the e⁄ort disutility (￿).
17We consider a shock to ￿, the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution across di⁄erent
labor inputs, that typically determines cost-push (wage mark-up) shocks in New Keynesian
models.
91% mark-up increase.
Figure 3 ￿The Phillips Curve shift
The obvious next step in our analysis is the identi￿cation of the optimal
in￿ ation rate. In this class of models the Friedman rule (Rt+1 = 1, ￿ m = ￿ ￿ 1)
is optimal when goods and labor markets distortions are in￿ ation invariant
(Neiss, 1999). In our framework one would expect that the optimal in￿ ation
rate should strike a balance between the bene￿ts in terms of markup reduction
and the in￿ ation-induced distortion on real money balances. Our calibrations
show instead that the disciplining e⁄ect of in￿ ation on wage markups never
compensates for the in￿ ation-induced distortion on real money balances. The
Friedman rule remains therefore optimal. This result is surprisingly robust and
holds for a wide range of parameter values. To support intuition, by using (24)

















































The term in curly brackets denotes the in￿ ation-induced gain in the con-
sumption/e⁄ort trade-o⁄. In our simulations we always ￿nd that this gain is
lower than the welfare loss deriving from the in￿ ation-induced reduction in real
money balances (Figure 4).
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Figure 4 ￿Welfare analysis
An increase in the in￿ ation target reduces real money balances (panel (a)),
raises worked hours (panel (b)) and reduces the e¢ ciency gap (panel (c)). The
fall in real money balances reduces the welfare (panel (e)), whereas the increase
in hours/consumption raises it (panel (f)). However, the overall e⁄ect is negative
(panel (g)). This apparent setback suggests that our result should be quali￿ed.
So far we have shown that a non-vertical Phillips curve obtains to the extent
that two conditions are satis￿ed:
1. wage contract renegotiations take place while expiring contracts are still
in place, enabling wage setters to internalize their consequences for sub-
sequent households￿choices;
2. in￿ ation adversely a⁄ects households￿welfare.
Within the relatively narrow framework of our model, this is not su¢ cient to
support the optimality of a positive in￿ ation rate. Intuition suggests, however,
that the disciplining e⁄ect on wage markups outlined here would still apply in
di⁄erent models that justify deviations from the Friedman rule. In the next
section we investigate the interaction between the seigniorage-induced in￿ ation
rate and the non-vertical Phillips curve mechanism outlined in this paper.
5.2 Seigniorage and optimal in￿ ation targets
Now we assume that public consumption is equal to 20% of GDP ￿in line with
postwar US data. The transfer Tt is set at 5:3%, in order to broadly match
11US data about total government expenditures net of production subsidies.18
Optimal policy thus faces a dilemma between increasing in￿ ation or taxes to
￿nance public expenditures. In the ￿ exible wage regime in￿ ation does not a⁄ect
wage-setters￿choices, but seigniorage is a substitute for tax distortions (e.g.,
Damjanovic and Nolan, 2009). By contrast, in the preset-wage regime in￿ ation
also a⁄ects the labor market wedge.
In ￿gure 5 below we plot the in￿ ation rate needed to ful￿ll the ￿scal solvency
requirement for a given tax distortion chosen by the government.19 Note that
in the preset wages regime in￿ ation unambiguously reduces the labor market
wedge, thereby increasing employment and the wage bill. As a result, lower
seigniorage revenues are necessary to ￿nance public expenditures at a given tax
rate. This, in turn, explains why government ￿nancing requires a lower in￿ ation
rate under preset wages.
Figure 5 ￿Seigniorage and in￿ ation in the two
regimes. Solid line: preset wages
In table 1 we also show that, given our benchmark calibrations, the observed
4% in￿ ation rate observed for the US might indeed be optimal.
18Other parameters are calibrated as in the previous section. Notice that ￿ and ￿ are
adjusted to ￿t observed velocity and employment at the new values of public consumption
and distortionary taxation.
19Note that in Figure 5 our de￿nition of the employment gap includes both market and
tax distortions. Thus the employment gap varies with tax distortion whereas the goods and
labor market wedge is held constant.
12Table 1 ￿Optimal targets, consumption and employment
￿ ￿ C L
Flexible price 7:5 33:1 0:15 0:18
Pre-set wages 4:0 32:2 0:16 0:20
6 Conclusions.
Recent developments in macroeconomics resurrect the view that welfare costs
of in￿ ation arise because this acts as a tax on money balances. Empirical analy-
ses of the labor market show that wage negotiations take place while expiring
contracts are still in place.
Bringing these seemingly unrelated aspects together in a stylized general
equilibrium model, we ￿nd a disciplining e⁄ect of a positive in￿ ation target
on the wage markup and identify a long-term trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and
output. Model simulations suggest that a moderate long-run in￿ ation rate gen-
erates non-negligible output gains.
The key assumption for our result is that, di⁄erently from standard New
Keynesian models usually based Calvo pricing, all nominal wages are prede-
termined to both the individual households￿and the policymaker￿ s decisions.
As a consequence, wage setters internalize the e⁄ects of their choice on money
holdings for the representative household￿ s welfare because in￿ ation is costly.
This, in turn, paves the way for the disciplining e⁄ect of in￿ ation targets and a
non-vertical Phillips curve.
Appendix A
Abstracting from the government expenditure, under preset wage employment









= lflex (1 + ￿m (lt(￿ m)))
1
1+￿ (27)
Recall that the endogenous markup is a function of the consumption level, which
is non linearly related to the labor supply by the real wage.


























1 + m ￿ ￿
(29)









1 + ￿m (lt(￿ m))
1
1 + ￿
￿￿1 " ￿ 1
"
￿m (lt(￿ m))
1 + m ￿ ￿
> 0 (30)
Note that the expression in parenthesis is one minus a product of terms all
smaller than one. Thus it is positive.
13Appendix B
In order to check the robustness of our results we also calibrate our model
following Christiano et al. (2005: 15-17), under the assumption of ￿ exible prices.
We set ￿ = 0:64, ￿ = 1, " = 8:5, ￿ = 0:97, ￿p = 1:2 and ￿w = 1:05. As
Christiano et al. (2005) we calibrate ￿ to normalize hours to one and ￿ at a
level consistent with the (annual) observed money velocity (1:76 for M2) when
in￿ ation is 4%, i.e. the observed average post-war in￿ ation in the US.
Figures below show that our results (large gains of preset wages with respect
to the case of ￿ exible wages and Friedman rule optimality) are con￿rmed.20

































20For the sake of brevity in Figure A2 we directly report the relationship between welfare
and real money balances Recall that they are inversely related to the in￿ation targets.
































Adam, K., and R.M. Billi (2006), ￿Optimal monetary policy under commitment
with a zero bound on nominal interest rates,￿Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 38: 1877-1905.
Altig, D., L. Christiano, M. Eichenbaum and J. Linde (2005), ￿Firm-speci￿c
capital, nominal rigidities and the business cycle,￿National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper No. 11034.
Antinol￿, G., C. Azariadis and J. Bullard (2007), ￿The optimal in￿ ation target
in an economy with limited enforcement,￿Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Working Paper No. 2007-037.
Barnes, M., F. Gumbau-Brisa, D. Lie and G. Olivei (2009), ￿Closed-form esti-
mates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve with time-varying trend in￿ a-
tion,￿Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 09-15.
Benigno, P. and L. Ricci (2008), ￿The in￿ ation-unemployment trade-o⁄ at
low in￿ ation,￿National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
13986.
Di Bartolomeo, G., P. Tirelli and N. Acocella (2008), ￿Trend in￿ ation as a
workers disciplining device in a general equilibrium model,￿Department of
Economics Working Paper No. 142, University of Milan Bicocca.
15Corsetti, G. and P. Pesenti (2001), ￿Welfare and macroeconomic interdepen-
dence,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116: 421-446.
Blinder, A.S. (1982) ￿The anatomy of double-digit in￿ ation in the 1970s￿in In-
￿ation: Causes and e⁄ects, R.E. Hall (ed.), Chicago, University of Chicago
Press: 261-282.
Bom￿m, A.N. and G.D. Rudebusch (2000), ￿Opportunistic and deliberate disin-
￿ ation under imperfect credibility,￿Journal of Money, Credit and banking,
32: 707-721.
Calvo, G.A. (1983), ￿Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework,￿Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 12: 383-398.
Choi, W.G. and S. Oh (2003), ￿A money demand function with output uncer-
tainty, monetary uncertainty, and ￿nancial innovations,￿Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 35: 685-709.
Christiano, L.J., M. Eichenbaum, C. Evans (2005), ￿Nominal rigidities and
the dynamic e⁄ects of a shock to monetary policy,￿ Journal of Political
Economy, 113: 1-45.
Christo⁄el, K., G. Coenen and A. Warne (2008), ￿The new area-wide model of
the euro area ￿A micro-founded open-economy model for forecasting and
policy analysis,￿European Central Bank Working Paper No 944.
Cogley, T. and A.M. Sbordone (2008), ￿Trend in￿ ation, indexation, and in￿ a-
tion persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,￿American Economic
Review, 98: 2101-2126.
Damjanovic, T. and C. Nolan (2009), ￿Seigniorage-maximizing in￿ ation under
sticky prices,￿forthcoming in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Dib, A. (2004), ￿Nominal rigidities and monetary policy in Canada,￿Journal
of Macroeconomics, 28: 303-325.
Du Caju, E. Gautier, D. Momferatou and M. Ward-Warmedinger (2008), ￿Insti-
tutional features of wage bargaining in 22 EU countries, the US and Japan,￿
European Central Bank Working Paper No 974.
Gali, J., M. Gertler and D. Lopez-Salido (2007), ￿Markups, gaps and the welfare
costs of business ￿ uctuations,￿The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89:
44-59
Graham, L. and D.J. Snower (2008), ￿Hyperbolic discounting and the Phillips
Curve,￿Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40: 427-448.
Goodfriend, M. and R.G. King (1997), ￿The New Neoclassical synthesis,￿ in
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, B.S. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg (eds.),
Cambridge, The MIT Press: 231-282.
Hetzel, R.L. (1998), ￿Arthur Burns and in￿ ation.￿ Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond Economic Quarterly, 84: 21-44.
16Ireland, P.N. (2007), ￿Changes in the Federal Reserve￿ s in￿ ation target: Causes
and consequences.￿Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39: 1851-2110.
Knell, M. and H. Stix (2005), ￿The income elasticity of money demand: A meta-
analysis of empirical results,￿Journal of Economic Surveys, 19: 513-533.
Jondeau, E. and J.G. Sahuc (2008), ￿Optimal monetary policy in an estimated
DSGE model of the Euro area with cross-country heterogeneity,￿Interna-
tional Journal of Central Banking, 4: 23-72.
Lagos, R. and R. Wright, (2005), ￿A uni￿ed framework for monetary theory
and policy analysis,￿Journal of Political Economy, 113: 463-484.
Mayer, T. (1998), Monetary policy and the great in￿ation in the United States:
The Federal Reserve and the failure of macroeconomic policy, 1965-79, Chel-
tenham, Edward Elgar.
Neiss, K.S. (1999), ￿Discretionary in￿ ation in a general equilibrium model,￿
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 31: 357-374.
Orphanides, A. and D. Wilcox (2002), ￿The opportunistic approach to disin￿ a-
tion,￿International Finance, 5: 47-71.
Rotemberg, J.J. (1982), ￿Monopolistic price adjustment and aggregate output,￿
The Review of Economic Studies, 49: 517-531.
Schmitt-GrohØ, S. and M. Uribe (2004), ￿Optimal ￿scal and monetary policy
under sticky prices,￿Journal of Economic Theory, 114: 198-230.
Tobin, J. (1972), ￿In￿ ation and unemployment,￿American Economic Review,
62: 1-18.
Woodford, M. (2003), Interest rate and prices, Princeton, Princeton University
Press.
17